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Religious Pluralism: Essential or Challenge to Liberal Democracy? 
Abstract: 
While religious pluralism is often regarded as a defining aspect of western liberal 
democracies, the mix of different religious and cultural identities has raised specific 
challenges for liberal democracies in Europe. Many religious communities, especially 
Muslim groups face criticisms of seeking religious exceptionalism within legal 
structures which are largely secular. This article reflects on the tension between the 
state’s commitment to upholding cultural diversity as a democratic good and the limits 
of social and legal pluralism.    
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While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in 
the general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the 
status of being taken to be generally right.1 
While religious pluralism is often regarded as a positive, indeed defining aspect of 
western democracies, the mix of different religious and cultural identities has raised some 
unique challenges for secular liberal democracies.  It has required us to rethink the limits of 
cultural pluralism and individualism for what sociologists and policy makers call ` integration’ 
and `cultural cohesion.’  In recent years, in much of Western Europe, there has been at times a 
critical reaction to what is seen as exceptionalism for religious communities, notably but not 
exclusively, for Muslims. This tension has led to a rethinking of the state’s relationship to 
religious faith and the growing sense of political and social divisions which have been 
exacerbated by the recent challenges of migration from multiple conflicts parts of the Middle 
East and North Africa. Yet underneath all this, is the legitimate but existential question of what 
Europe herself stands for as a cultural project and as unifying polity. The emergence of Europe 
as a cultural concept, a unit with all its plurality and diversity, has recently undergone a 
profound scrutiny in the social sciences and humanities. As Hana Horáková writes, ` In the 




field of socio-cultural anthropology there has been a shift from anthropology in Europe to 
anthropology of Europe.’2 
In Western Europe today, despite for example the Catholic Church being a dominant 
religious presence in France, the Church of England the established Church in the UK, when 
we speak of societal norms and laws, it is widely recognised that legal and public structures 
are largely secular. On one level, this simply means that governmental institutions are separate 
from religious institutions and that governments should neither enforce nor prohibit the free 
exercise of religion on its citizens as the state recognises religious choice  a matter of individual 
liberty.  These principles are based on the norms of democracies where political liberalism 
prevails. Political liberalism is complex but based on broad claims of equality, freedom and 
state neutrality with respect to religious observance, for all its citizens. Here, the state is 
sovereign above all other institutions, but it also bears a moral commitment towards all its 
citizens, especially its minorities. This can mean that despite a person’s own faith practices, 
values or their religious affiliations, it is the state which to some extent decides the religious 
from the non- religious, the public from the private and the communal from the personal.  In 
his definition of the modern democratic state liberal, Craig Hovey defines liberalism through 
the exploration of Rawlsian concepts of maximum justice and opportunity for all people: 
  
Liberalism is a political philosophy that seeks societal stability and unity in the absence 
of shared conceptions of the common good. It is therefore regularly associated with 
contemporary discussions of religious and other pluralisms and especially, in our day, 
is connected to the anxieties that set in when moral convictions previously thought to 
be self evidently true and binding lose their obviousness. How then will a society 
composed of diverse individuals – people of various faiths and traditions- function for 
its betterment?3 
Liberalism conceives of humans as individuals who enjoy relative freedom to organize their 
common lives. Beyond the definitions and limits of the nation state, law and governance, 
liberalism’s value lies in relating concepts of human dignity to happiness and human 
                                                             
2 Hana Horáková, Europe and Culture: Anthropological Perspectives on the Process of European Integration, 
Anthropological Journal of European Cultures, 18:2, Thematic Focus: Topics in Europeanist Research, 2009, 6-
27, 7. 
 
3 Craig Hovey, `Liberalism and Democracy’ in Craig Hovey and Elizabeth Phillips (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Political Theology, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 197.  
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empowerment, integral to human flourishing; this view has captured our imagination and 
immersed itself in the global political and legal discourse. In fact after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as the last threat to liberalism within Europe, the hegemony of liberalism is such that it 
would seem any resistance is unreasonable: 
 
Today Anglophone political philosophy is generally conducted in the light of the 
perceived triumph of liberalism. That is, it typically proceeds on the assumption that it 
is unreasonable, if not irrational or pathological, to resist liberalism, whether as a mode 
of thought or as a social order.4 
 
Such views are dominant in the socio-political paradigm of Western Europe and can be applied 
to the whole Euro-Atlantic political discourse.  Conversely, with its emphasis on individual 
agency, among the many critiques of political liberalism is the recurrent issue that liberalism 
lacks depth advancing concepts of the individual over the human person. Liberalism posits the 
doctrine of the `unencumbered self,’ where the individual must remain ̀ free and untrammelled’ 
whose autonomy is its supreme and inalienable right. The  Scottish theologian David Fergusson 
echoes the tension faced in freedom and rootedness in some form of religious worldview: 
 
It presents the individual as already valuing its autonomy prior to any other substantive 
moral commitments. In doing so, it denudes the self of the necessary resources for 
moral reasoning and decision-making. The individual of political liberalism is thus 
deracinated. She or he is no longer situated in a community or tradition of moral enquiry 
in terms of which judgements can be understood and practised. The shared goods and 
ends of human life are no longer built into the liberal individual’s initial moral situation. 
These can be selected and endorsed by an act of freedom, but for the unencumbered 
self it is hard to see on what basis reasons favouring one decision over another could 
be offered.5  
Individualism and the rights of the individual are not the same. But the rights based discourse 
is often presented as the point in history where freedom has finally arrived. The state for its 
part is concerned with the defence of the right and not just the good according to John Rawls's 
                                                             
4 Toula Nicolacopoulos, The Radical Critique of Liberalism: In Memory of a Vision, Melbourne:re.press, 2008, 3. 
5 David Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 59-60.  See 
also, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and Its Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. 
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definition. Political concepts are based on plurality, equality under the law, diversity and 
mutual limitations. As Hannah Arendt writes: 
A citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries. His 
rights  and duties must be defined and limited, not only by those of his fellow citizens, 
but also by the boundaries of a territory, Philosophy may conceive of the earth as the 
homeland of mankind and of one unwritten law, eternal and valid for all. Politics deals 
with men, nationals of many countries and heirs to many pasts; its laws are the 
positively established  fences  which hedge in, protect and limit the space in which 
freedom is not a concept, but a living political reality.6 
 
The States of Europe do not generally define ‘religion’ in their constitutions or other 
formal legislation, but, rather, leave it to the courts to determine whether something is 
‘religion.’ While each State in Europe has its own national law affecting religion and these  
national laws also function in wider legal environments, there is general agreement that 
Christianity has for centuries influenced the idea and identity of Europe. The Lisbon Treaty of 
2007 pays homage to the spiritual heritage of religion:  
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, 
from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights 
of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law 
Confirming heir attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law, 
Desiring to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, 
their culture and their traditions7 
 
While it mentions the role and contribution of churches, like the draft constitution of 2004, the 
2007 Treaty of Lisbon, does not specify which spiritual or religious heritage is inspirational.; 
indeed, Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that the Union must respect 
‘religious diversity’. It has been suggested that one reason for the deference of the EU to the 
principle that religion is best dealt with at the national level is that the EU lacks a strong cultural 
                                                             




identity of its own. In his excellent study exploring various European treatises, Norman Doe 
writes in acknowledging `religious diversity’ the EU show the ` need to work with ‘religious 
pluralism’ and the growth of interaction between religions in Europe and beyond. 
Consequently, the value of religions, of their diversity-plurality, is known to the EU legal order. 
The decision on Specific Programme Cooperation accepts that ‘appreciation and understanding 
of differences between value systems of different religions or ethnic minority groups lay 
foundations for positive attitudes.’8 
Despite this expansive conceptual and legal paradigm, the lived realities of religious 
pluralism remain complex. It is fair to say that the UK, notwithstanding declining church 
membership, is still a largely Christian country, if by that we mean the dominant faith of the 
land and one which informs its cultural landscape.  Institutional religion has declined as a 
cohesive force giving meaning and stability to communities or as Charles Tylor put it ` religion 
has lost its public hold.’  But our calendar, our formal occasions, our legal system, our social 
and literary reference points, our cultural memory, are still largely rooted in the context of 
Protestant Christianity. Other religious traditions have been brought in through the process of 
migration and for the most part, it would seem that the multicultural experiment so to speak 
was about simply letting people be. The larger point that religion with all its complexities, its 
blurred borders, still continues to be a central feature of human life, giving shape and meaning 
to our existence, is often lost in the frequent media attention given to contesting whether 
religion is a force for good or bad in the modern world.  Our conversations are often not so 
much about religion as a phenomenon but the perceived religious exceptionalism and how to 
protect the perceived secular public space. Here, religion is often seen as something which 
drags us back to an intolerant past, brings up images of the kind of God the west thought it had 
killed off, whereas liberal democracies are construed as being based on secular societal and 
political norms, which ground us in individual and protected freedoms and which pull us 
towards a hopeful future. And in many ways, one can understand why. Secularity as a process 
has been successful.  The rise of democratic rule, the concept of civil society, the consciousness 
of human rights, and individual freedom, have all accelerated the growth of secularism.  
Yet despite the relative strength of secularity as process, Islamic religiosity and 
visibility often poses a challenge.  This is a view which has gained political and social 
momentum since the New York terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent acts of terrorism. In 
                                                             




recent years, the recent flow of refugees and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, 
have reignited the civilizational debate about culture, religion and Europe’s Christian heritage. 
The speeches which resonate in many parts of Europe, invoke a nostalgia for what Europe once 
was. But they are seen by many as at best hearkening to an ideal rather than a reality of the 
past, thus divisive, even destructive to the peaceful continuity of the European project.  For 
some the most urgent reason why action on immigration is required lies precisely in the rise of 
nationalist, populist, anti-immigrant, anti-EU parties. Many politicians and activists have a 
deep desire to curb the effects of political rhetoric and populist movements which see the influx 
of refugees and uncontrolled borders as quite simply a threat to European civilisation. In her 
closing speech of the two-day Front National Party conference in 2017, Marine Le Pen, 
proclaimed that that ‘we are at a crossroad…this election is a choice of civilisation’ in the face 
of ‘massive migration’9. The structural dominance of sovereign states  and nationalist priorities 
have resulted in various kinds of backlash against migrant flows often at the expense of humane 
or visionary solutions.Words such as traveller, migrant, refugee and displaced persons are often 
used interchangeably but they mean different things legally and politically. They have become 
intrinsic to the contested moral discourse around human dignity versus monetary resources 
challenging convictions about identity, race, social cohesion and belonging. This has also led 
to disputed concepts of good religion/bad religion, good migrant/bad migrant where religion, 
namely Islam is seen to have contributed to the contemporary political and social unsettling of 
Europe and the West.10 
These events and attitudes fuel the return to familiar historical tropes of pitting white, 
Protestant Christianity against a non - white Islam, essentialising Islam as the archaic and often 
unwelcome other of a politically open and benign, Christian, Anglo Saxon Europe.  Islam’s 
beliefs and practices are too visible and awkward, and it doesn’t quite fit in with the moral 
demands and attractions of modern western life. And yet, in struggling to reconnect with a lost 
religiosity, powerful voices have spoken of Islam as continuing to offer Europe transcendental 
hope. Pope Benedict XV1 spoke of Europe ` losing its soul.’ His lament was for Europe’s lost 
Christian heritage, ` Not only are we no longer Christian, we’re anti –Christian; so we don’t 
                                                             
9 Elaine Ganley, “Far-Right Hopeful Le Pen: French election ‘choice of civilisation’,” The Associated Press, 
February 5, 2017, accessed March 30, 2017, http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/far-right-hopeful-le-pen-french-
election-choice-of-civilization-1.3271916. 
10 For more, see Wilson and Mavelli in ` The Refugee Crisis and Religion, beyond Conceptual and Physical 
Boundaries’ in Luca Mavelli and Erin K. Wilson (eds.), The Refugee Crisis and Religion, London: Rowman & 
Littlefield International, 2017. 
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know who we are.’ And despite his critique of Islam, he notes that `only Islam is capable of 
offering a valid spiritual basis for the life of the peoples, a basis that seems to have slipped out 
of the hands of old Europe, which thus notwithstanding its continued political and economic 
power, is increasingly viewed as a declining culture condemned to fade away.11   
For others, anti - Muslim sentiment is both a racial and religious issue – both have 
become almost taboo subjects and yet, they are hidden within the ultimate debate around 
values. Today, it is not religious doctrines which ignite passions in our communal and 
interconnected life, but values. The terrorist attacks including the London bombings in 2005, 
were seen by many to be the result of a deep malaise amongst many second or third generation 
Muslims who felt no loyalty to Britain.  This was seen as a failure of multiculturalism, a policy  
which broadly speaking refers to the `political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant 
group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race, ethnicity or 
religion.’12 Indeed, in 2011, the former UK Prime Minister David Cameron commented that 
multiculturalism had failed, echoing Angela  Merkel’s remarks earlier that year that 
multiculturalism had failed, completely failed, even though Germany had never adopted a 
multicultural policy agenda. If you don’t feel the UK is home, if you haven’t nurtured a sense 
of belonging, it is because your values need to change. 
As Anne Norton writes in her book On the Muslim Question the `Muslim question like 
the Jewish question before it, is connected to fears for national and international security.’ She 
writes that `Whether they praised or blamed liberalism, whether they sought to advance to or 
to forestall democracy, Western philosophers saw the Jewish question as the axis on which 
these struggles turned. Modern struggles over faith and secularism, progress and loss, 
alienation and community, equality and difference were fought out on the terrain of the Jewish 
question.’ Today however: 
The figure of the Muslim has become the axis where the questions of political 
philosophy and political theology, politics and ethics meet. Islam is marked as the 
preeminent danger to politics; to Christians, Jews and secular humanists; to women, sex 
and sexuality; to the values and institutions of the Enlightenment.13 
                                                             
11  Russell Shorto, `The Anti-Secularist: Can Pope Benedict XV1 Re-Christianize Europe?’ The New York Times 
Magazine, April 8, 2007. 
12 See Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer (eds), European Multiculturalisms, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012, 5. 
13 Ann Norton, On the Muslim Question, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 2-3. 
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Conversely, for many Christians who hope for a return of Christendom only a Christian Europe 
can accommodate and welcome Islam.  When in 2018, the British singer Sinead O’ Connor 
announced she was converting to Islam, the Christian theologian John Millbank wrote in 
defence of the West and its Christian heritage,`Houellebecq has it right. Liberals will embrace 
an authoritarianism to escape their own contradictions if it is respectably other and non-
Western. She is a civilisational traitress. And has no taste.’14 Political theology is increasingly 
being polarised as a theology of civilizational choices. 
While such opinions and retorts make for interesting social media discussions, what 
most keeps religion present on the public and political radar, are the legal cases which reflect 
the tension between law, public morality and seemingly religious exceptionalism. The nature 
of religion is most usually elucidated in case-law. The following examples show that at least 
in the context of the UK and Western Europe generally, a nation's moral consciousness is far 
less grounded in religious authority than it was only a generation ago. But the state is not 
morally neutral, it has its own commitments to equality and rights. Firstly, the vexed issue of 
female clothing and the Gerin report. What is acceptable clothing in western terms assumed an 
interesting twist in the Gerin Report of 2010 when it was claimed that the French ban on the 
full face veil did not go against the freedom of dress because western civilisation had no such 
things as `clothes for the face. The Gerin Report emphasised  the French republican values of 
liberty, equality and fraternity and had as one of its central arguments that the face veil 
eliminates the possibility for individual expression, thus disabling its wearer from being an 
equal in society. On this point the members of the Commission were clear: 
The face veil denies all individuality and thus all dignity to the one who wears it, 
whether she does so voluntarily or not. But the equal dignity of all human beings is the 
philosophical, even anthropological foundation of the principle of equality in our 
Republic.15 
The discussions on veiling in Europe are now immersed in complex ideals of freedom, 
femininity and faith. They are also about the shared public space. The political philosopher 
Blandine Kriegel who worked for President Chirac argued for the social contract, `We believe 
in laicite because we have to place ourselves in the public space, by abstracting from our 
                                                             
14 http://www.euro-islam.info/2018/11/09/sinead-oconnors-embrace-islam-leads-debate-conversions-
existential-threat-west-controversy/ 
15See Kirsten M. Yoder Wesselhoeft, `Genderd Secularity: The Feminine Individual in the 2010 Gerin 
Report, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 31:3, 2001. 
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individual characteristics, from where we came, our roots. This is the idea of the social 
contract. Thus, what she is implying is that although people can come with different traditions 
and histories, the movement should be from pluralism to unity through consent. The public 
space should be neutral with respect to religion. Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin defended 
the ban on explicitly religious symbols in public spaces in his address to the French legislature 
but also adding that France was the `old land of Christianity' and showed his commitment to 
the inviolable principle of laicite. In the case of France, he added religion cannot be a political 
project and `For the most recently arrived, I'm speaking here of Islam, secularism is a chance, 
the chance to be a religion of France.'16 
  
More recently in 2019, the Flanders region of Belgium, the region that is historically 
home to most Belgian Jews, outlawed the ritual slaughter of animals. And a similar law came 
into place in August in Wallonia, the French speaking south. Defenders of the law argue that is 
motivated purely by animal welfare, that this law does not undermine religious freedoms and 
that those who observe ritually slaughtered meat, can still buy such slaughtered meat in 
different parts of Belgium. But for many Jewish and Muslim citizens, this ban reflects a rising 
anti Jewish and anti Muslim trend and the limits of social pluralism. The legal decisions as to 
which minority will win in the perceived battle between religious minorities and animal welfare 
organisations, are based on making choices about preferred, cultural values.17 
It is worth pointing out that for most western Europeans, the word which most evokes 
anti liberalism is shari`a because it sees shari`a as the ultimate challenge to liberal values rather 
than intrinsic to various forms religious observance. The problem with starting any 
conversation on shari`a is exactly where do you start? Misleadingly but commonly translated 
as Islamic law, the term has become synonymous with penal law, stripped of its broader ethical 
dimensions and the fluidity of juristic reasoning. Shari`a can be both a lived reality with all its 
internal complexities as well as a historical intellectual enterprise. In western public and 
scholarly discussions, the term is simplified and often locked into important but poorly thought 
through, even contemptuous discussions on particular modes of punishment and women’s 
agency. It goes down the positive law route, coded and defined as the West understands law. 
But the reality is that a word which for centuries belonged to the colonial other, considered 
                                                             





low, even dead tradition is now an observed reality in Europe.  For many it represents an 
audacity, a hostility or apathy to everything the Enlightenment project has struggled against. 
Envied by some, despised by others, it represents a faith without boundaries.  
In popular discourse shari`a is an all-encompassing term which is more akin to worship, 
ritual and custom, than law in any normative sense, and thus more susceptible to a variety of 
practices. In fact shari`a should not have the word `law’ next to it as terms such as Islamic law 
and Muhammadan law were colonialist constructions and do not illustrate the complexity of 
shari`a as a conceptual and lived reality. Essentialising Islam continues through the erroneous 
perceptions of shari`a. Firstly that all Muslims share the same understanding of shari`a which 
is reduced simply to rules. In fact, rituals around fasting and prayer, ablutions and slaughter, as 
well as observance of aspects of marriage and divorce all fall within the structures of shari`a. 
and the boundaries of custom, ritual and legalism are often blurred.  The question `What does 
shari`a say? is a misleading point of inquiry because it shows how superficially shari`a is 
perceived as the term falls within modernity’s definitions of law and religion.  
However, issues of religious conscience appear in all religious groups and can often 
result in drawn out legal disputes between individuals and the courts. One such example is the 
story termed the `gay cake’ case. In 2014, a Christian couple, Daniel and Amy McArthur, who 
run the Belfast-based Ashers Baking Company, told the gay rights activist Gareth Lee they 
would not make a cake with the words `support gay marriage.’ The owners of the bakers 
defended their position on the grounds of their Christian beliefs.  When Mr Lee sued Ashers 
on the grounds of discrimination, a long running legal battle began debating the rights of both 
parties. The initial findings by Belfast County Court in 2015 concluded that  the bakery had 
broken political, religious and sexual orientation discrimination laws. But in 2018, the Supreme 
Court overturned the decision. Supreme Court president Lady Hale said the couple did not 
refuse to make the cake because of Mr Lee's sexual orientation. She said, `Their objection was 
to the message on the cake, not to the personal characteristics of Mr Lee or anyone else with 
whom he was associated.’ She went on to say, `The bakers could not refuse to supply their 
goods to Mr Lee because he was a gay man or supported gay marriage, but that is quite different 
from obliging them to supply a cake iced with a message with which they profoundly 
disagreed.’ Lady Hale said the ruling was not in any way to diminish the need to protect gay 
people from discrimination,’ but that what happened in this case was not discrimination. The 
case distinguished between the rights of the individuals and protection of religious conscience. 
11 
 
The owners of the bakers also insisted that Mr Lee was welcome to return to their bakery, 
saying, `We're particularly pleased the Supreme Court emphatically accepted what we've said 
all along - we did not turn down this order because of the person who made it, but because of 
the message itself.’18 Such cases amplify accusations of religious exceptionalism against many 
Christian groups. Christians groups in turn often feel that their rights are too easily trampled 
upon in a society where liberalism only wishes to tolerate liberalism, leaving religious 
conscience struggling to manifest itself on various matters of private and public interests.  
The liberal nation state has not really been able to flatten the public space and religious 
group have always relied or created exceptionalism to define themselves from majority rule. 
However defined, pluralism has always been about the tensions of self- determination amongst 
minority and majority groups. Even as far back as the 8th century, under the growth of Islamic 
law and governance, many Christians, who actually were the majority population, remained  
determined that their religious and cultural identities remain distinct.  In his recent work 
Between Christ and Caliph, Lev E. Weitz examines the multi-confessional society of early 
Islam through the lens of shifting marital practices of Syriac Christian communities. Despite 
the growth of Islamic law and governance from the 7th century onwards, Syriac Christian 
bishops created new laws to regulate marriage, inheritance, and family life. The bishops banned 
polygamy, required that Christian marriages be blessed by priests, and restricted marriage 
between cousins, seeking ultimately to distinguish Christian social patterns from those of 
Muslims and Jews. Their desire was to be a community apart while still maintaining a place in 
the Islamic social order. Household life was tied to religious – this inter-religiosity lay at the 
heart of the medieval Islamic empire. Pluralism has always been about managing societal and 
identity tensions.19 
 
Today, the modern nation-state has the power to penetrate all layers of society in a way 
simply incomparable with anything in the pre-modern period. But liberal democracy requires 
pluralism because it is both strengthened and challenged by diversity – this is not easy but in 
our globalised and on the move world, we need to find ways of legally and socially living 
together. If not, populism in all its forms then thrives on conflict, on the perceived fracturing 
                                                             
18 https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/ashers-gay-cake-case-goes-to-the-european-
court-38404670.html. See also https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-43955734 
 
19 See various descriptions in Lev E. Weitz, Between Christ and Caliph, Law, Marriage and Christian Community 
in early Islam, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018.  
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of civilisations within and across the boundaries of values. While liberal democracies make 
give rise to concerns about civilizational choices, they themselves are now seen to be under 
strain. Their commitment to religious pluralism as a social good, even if not necessarily as a 
moral worth, needs more rigorous defence. This is partly because the liberal state has another 
concern – constitutional commitment to equality for all. The rise of populism poses a threat to 
this commitment. While populism remains a politically contested concept, Jan- Werner Muller 
argues that populists are always anti pluralist because populism is wedded to neither 
constitutionalism nor liberalism. He argues that populism rides on the `broken promise of 
democracy- that our social and political framework always favours one group over another and 
that `ordinary working people are being left behind’ by the privileged elite. This is its biggest 
appeal and a testament to a certain failure in politicians who have failed to appreciate growing 
social unrest and frustration.  
Thus, populism often is accompanied by `nativism’ and hostility to immigrants and 
immigration.  A commitment to real pluralism requires courage and humility in equal measures 
because it means making difficult choices about the true worth of coexistence and the sacrifices 
required. It is easy to argue that multiculturalism does not have any particular value or moral 
weight. But any critique of antipluralism must recognise that a denial of diversity effectively 
means denying the status of certain citizens as free and equal. As Müller writes: 
These citizens might not be excluded officially, but the public legitimacy of their 
individual values, ideas of what makes for the good life, and even material interests are 
effectively called into question, and even declared not to count. As John Rawls argued,  
accepting pluralism is not a recognition of the empirical fact that we live in diverse 
societies; rather it amounts to a commitment to try to find fair terms of sharing the same 
political space with others whom we respect as free and equal but also as irreducibly 
different in their identities and interests.20  
We all make moral choices about how to live as communities within society, and to 
recognise others as communities who share the same space. Pluralism is both an ideal and a 
process. In an age of soundbites, hashtags and now fake news, we need to stretch a sympathetic 
imagination to meet the cultural challenges of our time. And these challenges however 
polarising, will not be resolved by harsh words and clashes which have increasingly informed 
the politics of our time. Our politics reflects our ethics to a certain extent. Liberal democracies 
                                                             
20 Jan-Werner Muller, What is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, 47 and 57.  
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can lead to various ways of living because they allow freedom to  develop a desired vision for 
your life and the society around you. Words matter across the political spectrum because peace, 
justice and community are all fragile. There is no room for complacency but neither it seems 
is there any alternative to coexistence 
